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COMMENTS
HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR-
A LOUISIANA DILEMMA?
Where a federal constitutional right has been violated at
the trial level, reviewing courts often have been reluctant to
apply the harmless error doctrine. The United States Supreme
Court has reversed convictions in a variety of situations without
finding prejudice to the defendant where such a constitutional
violation occurred.1 In Kotteakos v. U.S.,2 the Court stated in
dicta that the federal harmless error rule might be inapplicable
in the face of a constitutional violation.8 Accordingly, it has been
urged that harmless constitutional error does not exist and that
a rule of automatic reversal is appropriate.4 On the other hand,
harmless error has been found in some instances involving con-
stitutional violations.5 And in 1963, in Fahy v. Connecticut, the
majority of the Court found it unnecessary "to decide whether
the erroneous admission of evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure can ever be subject to the normal rules
of 'harmless error'. . . ."7 Finally, in Chapman v. California,s the
Court took the position that harmless error might apply in some
cases of constitutional error.9
1. The violations include the following: pre-trial community-wide broad-
cast of defendant's confession, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1962);
trial for felony offense without counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1962); arraignment for capital offense without counsel, Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); admission of coerced confession, Payne v.
Arkansas, 856 U.S. 560 (1957); incorrect presumption given in charge tojury, Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1945); trial with a biasedjudge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); admission of involuntary con-
fession, Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
2. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
3. The Court said: "If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure
that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the
verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure
is from a constitutional %orm . . . ." Id. at 764-65. (Emphasis added.)
4. See Comment, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967) and Note, 36 BROOKLYN L.
Rzv. 139 (1969).
5. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) and Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). Both violations involved the right to confronta-
tion guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
6. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
7. Id. at 86.
8. 386 U.S. 18 (1966).
9. Concluding that some constitutional errors could be deemed harmless,
the Court held that "before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt .... Applying the foregoing standard, we have
no doubt that the error in these cases was not harmless to the petitioners."
14. at 24.
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The Chapman Rule
By establishing in Chapman the doctrine of harmless con-
stitutional error, the Court did three things: (1) divided constitu-
tional error into two types, one calling for automatic reversal
and the other allowing a finding of harmless error;10 (2) for-
mulated and applied the new federal test;11 (3) made mandatory
the application of this test by both federal and state appellate
courts in order to find harmless constitutional error.12 It is sub-
mitted that, of the three, only the third statement was made
sufficiently explicit to require no further discussion.'" The
method of distinguishing the two types of constitutional error
is unclear from the language of Chapman, and has been dis-
cussed elsewhere.14 This Comment will focus on two objectives:
first, to determine as nearly as possible the formulation and
proper method of applying the rule of harmless constitutional
error and, second, to analyze the effects of this rule on the
Louisiana jurisprudence and procedure concerning harmless
error.
Verbalization of the Rule
Any analysis of the rule of harmless constitutional error
must be based necessarily on the language of the Supreme Court
decisions. Since Chapman, the Court has ruled in three separate
cases,15 all ostensibly affirming 0 the rule of Chapman. It is
10. Id. at 22.
11. The language of the Court in Chapman was "whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have con-
tributed to the conviction" and that "the court must be able to declare a
belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24.
12. In speaking of whether a state harmless error rule could apply where
a federal right had been violated, the Court said: "With faithfulness to the
constitutional union of the States, we cannot leave to the States the formula-
tion of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people
from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights." Id. at 21.
13. But see State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 394 (1971) where the
Louisiana supreme court read Chapman as allowing the application of the
Louisiana harmless error rule.
14. See generally Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The InpltNa-
tions of Chapman v. Californ a, 53 MINN. L. Rsv. 519 (1969) and Comment,
18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 202 (1970) for excellent analyses distinguishing types of
constitutional error. Such a distinction is unnecessary for present purposes
since this paper will be limited to situations in which harmless error is to
be applied.
15. Milton v. Wainwright, 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 92
S. Ct. 1056 (1972); and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
16. In Harrington, the Court stated: "We do not depart from Chap-
man; nor do we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it." Harrington v.
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believed that reconciliation of the later decisions with Chapman,
while difficult, is possible.
In Chapman, petitioner argued that a violation of a federal
constitutional right could never be harmless. Alternatively, he
argued that should harmless error be applicable, a federal
standard should be used rather than the state rule by which
his conviction was affirmed. The Court rejected the first con-
tention but upheld the second, stating that the formulation of a
harmless error rule to be applied where federal rights are
violated is a question of federal law.'7 Accordingly, the Court
proceeded to fashion an appropriate rule. Both the federal stat-
utory rule's and the California constitutional rule'9 were cited
and seemingly rejected, while -language used in an earlier deci-
sion of the Court was approved:
"We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what
was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecti-
cut .... There we said: "The question is whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction . . . .' There is
little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy V.
Connecticut . . . and requiring the beneficiary of a consti-
tutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict ob-
tained. We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning
of our Fahy case when we hold as we do now, that before a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). Justice Brennan, however, dissented:
"The Court today overrules Chapman v. California. . . . the very case it
purports to apply." Id. at 255. See 36 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 139, 143 (1969). The
majority opinions in Schneble and Milton also cited Chapman in finding
harmless error.
17. For possible theories to support this contention of a federal ques-
tion, see Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chap-
man v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969) and Comment, 20 STAN. L.
Rav. 83, 88 n.40 (1967).
18. Harmless Error Rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970) provides: "On the
hearing of any appeal ... the court shall give judgment... without regard
to errors ... which do not affect . . . substantial rights. ... The phrase
"affects substantial rights" has been interpreted by at least one writer
to require an appreciable degree of probability that the error contributed
to the verdict before it is considered prejudicial. Note, 47 COLUM. L. Rev.
450, 451 (1947). This is clearly a greater requirement than Chapman's "rea-
sonable possibility," supporting that decision's rejection of the federal rule.
19. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4%.
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must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."20
Thus, the test after Chapman was "whether there is a rea-
sonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction" 21 and that "the court must be able
to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." This language was repeated verbatim in many
subsequent applications of the test.23 The crucial question, how-
ever, is the meaning of the language-the manner in which an
appellate court must review the record to determine harmless
error. There are three possible approaches. An appellate court
may limit its inquiry either to (1) the amount of evidence
untainted by the error, or (2) the effect of the error itself on
the conviction, or (3) it may look to a combination of both
factors.
The Court in Chapman spoke disparagingly of the California
court's emphasis on "overwhelming evidence" 24 apart from the
error in finding it harmless. Further, the standard applied in
Fahy, which was adopted by the Court in Chapman, expressly
rejected consideration of whether there was sufficient untainted
evidence to support a finding of harmless error.25 The critical
difference between the two tests is this. If an appellate court
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had
no effect on the jury's determination of guilt before it can con-
clude harmless error, then any doubt as to the effect of the
error, regardless of the other evidence, must dictate reversal"8
However, by using a standard of independently sufficient evi-
dence, a court can find harmless error if enough untainted evi-
dence exists to support the conviction, regardless of the effect
20. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1966).
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Gilday v. Scafati, 428
F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1970); Brown v. Beto, 425 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Clark, 416 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1969); Dean v. Hocker, 409 F.2d 319
(9th Cir. 1969); Solomon v. United States, 408 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States v. LaVallee, 391 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1966).
25. The majority in Fahy said: "We are not concerned here with whether
there was sufficient evidence on which petitioner could have been convicted
without the evidence complained of." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86
(1963). Justice Harlan, dissenting, said this test was "a much stricter
standard than that of independently sufficient evidence .... " Id. at 95.
26. O.. Pearson v. United States, 389 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1968).
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of. the error.2 The former test, concentrating on the effect of
the error, seemed to be endorsed by Chapman. If followed
strictly, though, this test seems almost tantamount to automatic
reversal,28 since it would be extremely difficult for a court to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error had
no effect on the jury's verdict.
Harrington
The strict requirements and uncertain meaning of the
Chapman test led to the second Supreme Court decision on
harmless constitutional error. In Harrington v. California,29 the
Court again went through the process of applying and sup-
posedly clarifying the test, but while expressly stating a reaffir-
mation of Chapman,80 the Court arguably modified the test,81
concluding that "apart from [the tainted confessions] the case
against Harrington was so overwhelming that we conclude that
this violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt .... ',82 (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court here considered
the amount of untainted evidence in finding harmless error.
Further, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that they
must reverse if there was a possibility that a single juror reached
his verdict because of the error:
"We of course do not know the jurors who sat. Our judg-
ment must be based on our own reading of the record and
on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of
the two confessions on the minds of an average jury."
Whether the Court in Harrington was merely trying to clarify
27. In his dissent in Fahy, Justice Harlan stated that an affirmance by
this test still allows the possibility that the jury relied on the tainted evi-
dence and, therefore, would have reached a different verdict otherwise.
In People v. Ross, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 269, 429 P.2d 606, 621 (1967), Chief
Justice Traynor explained in his dissent that "the jury may have reached
its verdict because of the error without considering other reasons un-
tainted by error that would have supported the same result."
28. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 205 (1967).
29. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
30. See note 16 supra.
31. See note 25 supra for the analysis of the Court in Fahy, adopted in
Chapman, which rejected consideration of the sufficiency of the untainted
evidence.
32. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
33. Id. Arguably, this differed from Chapman in that here the Court
looked to the probable impact of the error, while in Chapman the Court
stated that to find harmless error they must believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error played no role in the conviction.
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the meaning intended in Chapman is uncertain.84 The language
of the two decisions, however, clearly justifies the argument that
different tests were used.
Recent Decisions
The trend in Harrington away from the strict language of
Chapman emphasizing the effect of the error and toward a more
expansive consideration of the untainted evidence apart from the
error was continued in the two most recent Supreme Court
decisions on harmless constitutional error. In Schneble v.
Florida8 and in Milton v. Wainwright, 6 both 1972 decisions, the
Court found constitutional violations harmless error. In Schneble,
as in Harrington, the violation consisted of the admission into
evidence of statements of a co-defendant who did not testify.
The Court found the independent evidence of guilt, which in-
cluded petitioner's own confession, overwhelming. Milton in-
volved an allegedly illegal confession, admitted over objection,
which petitioner claimed violated his sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel as interpreted in Massiah v. United States.37
However, noting that "no less than three full confessions were
made by petitioner" in addition to the challenged confession,
the Court was satisfied that the error, if any, was harmless.
The dissent in Schneble attacked the sufficiency of the inde-
pendent evidence which the majority found to support the con-
clusion of harmless error. Justice Marshall, writing for the
minority, protested what he termed an extension of Harrington
in that in the instant case the evidence of guilt apart from the
error-petitioner's confession-was itself in controversy. The jury
had been charged to determine the voluntariness of the confes-
sion before considering it. Questioning the majority's assumption
that the jury must have ruled the confession voluntary since
they "could on no rational hypothesis have found Schneble
guilty without reliance on his confession,"8 9 Justice Marshall
34. See Note, 83 HARv. L. REv. 814 (1969) maintaining that the Court in
Chapman did in fact consider the untainted evidence when they determined
that the jury might have returned a not-guilty verdict in the absence of
the tainted evidence. This supports the contention that Harrington, while
considering the amount of untainted evidence, merely clarified Chapman.
35. 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972).
36. 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972).
37. 377 U. S. 201 (1964).
38. Milton v. Wainwright, 92 S. Ct. 2174, 2175 (1972).
39. Schneble v. Florida, 92 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1972).
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maintained that the Court had no way of knowing whether the
jury actually ruled the confession voluntary. Certainly, it was
possible that the confession was disregarded and the conviction
based instead to some degree on the statement of the co-
defendant. Similar doubt was expressed by Justice Stewart in
his dissent for the minority in Milton. However, the thrust of
his argument centered on the effect of the error, the corroborat-
ing effect that the illegal confession might have on the weight
given by the jury to the confessions:
"Surely there is at the least a reasonable doubt whether
in these circumstances the introduction of Langford's testi-
mony did not contribute to the verdict of first degree murder
returned by the jury .... 40
In summary, these four decisions seem to indicate a trend
toward a liberal rule of harmless constitutional error, charac-
terized by a greater emphasis on the untainted evidence of guilt
rather than on the effect of the error only.
Reconcilation: The Meaning of the Rule
It is submitted that the probable intention of the Court is to
consider both factors-the untainted evidence and the error's
effect on the jury-in applying the test. The Court used the
word "overwhelming" rather than "sufficient" to describe the
necessary untainted evidence. Evidence sufficient in the judg-
ment of a reviewing court to support a conviction does not rule
out the possibility that the jury would have acquitted without
the tainted evidence, since they could have failed to consider
some of the untainted evidence, basing the conviction largely
on the erroneously admitted evidence.41 But the more over-
whelming the untainted evidence, the less likely is the possibility
that the jury failed to consider also enough untainted evidence
for the conviction, thus making the error truly harmless. Thus
if the evidence is overwhelming enough, the court could say
that the effect of the error was harmless, at least beyond a
reasonable doubt. At the same time, the more grievous the
error, the more pernicious its effect on the guilt determination
process-the more overwhelming would be the evidence required.
Consequently, some errors could never be held harmless, regard-
40. Milton v. Wainwright, 92 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (1972).
41. See note 34 supra.
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less of the amount of untainted evidence,42 since it would be
virtually impossible to determine how much other evidence was
overshadowed by and overlooked because of the influence of the
error.43 The difference between this test and that of indepen-
dently sufficient evidence is admittedly one of degree. However,
by qualifying the amount of evidence needed by the magnitude
of the error, this rule has the virtue of protecting the defendant
without nullifying the contribution of the doctrine of harmless
error to judicial economy.
Louisiana and Harmless Constitutional Error: The Beginnings
The federal rule, then, allows a finding of harmless constitu-
tional error only where the reviewing court, after examining the
entire record, finds the untainted evidence of guilt so over-
whelming that the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of could not have affected the result.
The fact that this rule must be applied by Louisiana appellate
courts before constitutional error can be found harmless raises
several problems, the clarification of which may be effected by
an analysis of the Louisiana decisions since Chapman involving
constitutional error.
The first case in which the harmless constitutional error
rule was an issue was State v. Hopper.44 Defendant, in a joint
trial, was convicted of manslaughter. Neither defendant testified,
but testimony of the oral confessions of each, both implicating
the confessor and his co-defendant, was admitted with limiting
instructions by the trial judge. Defendant Hopper appealed, and
his conviction was affirmed.45 Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court granted writs and remanded 4 the case for fur-
ther consideration in light of Bruton v. United States47 and
Roberts v. Russell.48 The Louisiana supreme court, on remand,
42. "We admonished in Chapman ... against giving too much emphasis
to 'overwhelming evidence' of guilt, stating that constitutional errors affect-
ing the substantial rights of the aggrieved party could not be considered to
be harmless." Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
43. See Note, 83 HARv. L. Rzv. 814 (1969).
44. 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969).
45. 251 La. 77, 203 So.2d 222 (1967).
46. 392 U.S. 658 (1967).
47. 391 U.S. 123 (1967). In Bruton, the Court held that the admission
at a joint trial of a co-defendant's extrajudicial confession implicating
petitioner, despite limiting instructions, violated petitioner's rights under
the sixth amendment.
48. 392 U.S. 293 (1968). Roberts made the rule of Bruton retroactive.
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held that, although Hopper's sixth amendment right was violated,
the error was harmless under Louisiana's harmless error rule,
since the violation was "technical" rather than "substantial."49
Justice Barham dissented on the ground that the Chapman man-
date clearly prohibited the application of the state harmless error
rule in such a case.5 Further, he argued that automatic reversal
was appropriate for this type of constitutional error.51
Anderson: Defining the Problem
Soon after Hopper, the court decided State v. Anderson,52
which also involved a Bruton violation. Again the court affirmed,
stating that "[t]he harmless error rule applies to the use of such
confessions at a joint trial"53 and citing the Louisiana harmless
error rule, Harrington, and Hopper. Again Justice Barham dis-
sented, pointing out that "the admission of evidence which
violates a federal constitutional right can be ruled harmless only
under the federal standard for harmless error . . . . 4 Justice
Barham then listed the steps to be followed in applying the
federal rule, one of which is that the reviewing court, to deter-
mine whether the admissible evidence overwhelmingly supports
the verdict, must examine the complete record, including all
testimony and evidence adduced at trial.55 This single require-
ment is the basis for the dilemma in which the Louisiana
supreme court finds itself on harmless constitutional error.56
49. State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 447-48, 218 So.2d 551, 553-54 (1969).
LA. CoD CRIM. P. art. 921 reads: "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed
by an appellate court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court
after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error com-
plained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial viola-
tion of a constitutional or statutory right."
50. 253 La. at 466, 218 So.2d at 560.
51. Id. Although Harrington subsequently held the harmless error rule
applicable to the same constitutional violation, there is some support for
the contention that such a violation of sixth amendment rights should
call for automatic reversal. See Note, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139 (1969).
52. 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329 (1969).
53. Id. at 1129, 229 So.2d at 337.
54. Id. at 1141, 229 So.2d at 341.
55. The Court in Harrington said: "Our judgment must be based on our
own reading of the record ...." 395 U.S. at 254. Accord, Ignacio v. Territory
of Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Johnson, 412 F.2d
753 (1st Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 281 F. Supp.
96 (W.D. Penn. 1968).
56. LA. COD CRIM. P. art. 921 (harmless error rule) requires "an exam-
ination of the entire record" and would seemingly pose the same dilemma
as the federal test. However, the "record" has been held to include only
the evidence appended to and made part of a perfected bill of exceptions.
State v. Cooper, 241 La. 757, 131 So.2d 55 (1961).
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The Louisiana bill of exception procedure 57 is a set of formal and
technical rules limiting the appellate court's consideration to
only that evidence which is pertinent to the questioned ruling
and which is formally attached to a perfected bill of exceptions.
Courts refuse to review any evidence not so attached, even
where the complete transcript is available for other reasons.
Also, article VII59 of the Louisiana Constitution limits review
in criminal cases to questions of law, which, according to the
jurisprudence,6° does not include inquiry into the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting a verdict.
Given the mandate and method of the federal rule of harm-
less constitutional error, the problem in Louisiana becomes clear.
The federal rule demands an examination of the entire record
and a finding of overwhelming untainted evidence before a con-
stitutional error can be deemed harmless. The Louisiana supreme
court is simply unable to apply this rule and at the same time
remain consistent to the Louisiana rules of procedure and juris-
prudence.
Attempted Resolutions by the Court
With this background, one can readily appreciate the
dilemma of the court after the Chapman decision. As has been
noted,"' the court in Hopper failed to consider the federal man-
date. The majority in Anderson seemingly recognized the per-
suasiveness of Justice Barham's dissent in Hopper and cited
both the Louisiana statutory rule and Harrington, but were still
unable to apply the federal rule correctly without the complete
record. Then in State v. McGregor0 2 and State v. Mixon,68 the
court indicated an application of the federal rule, citing Harring-
ton. Such an application was possible in these two cases since
the complete transcripts were in fact before the court, though
57. LA. COD CRIM. P. arts. 841-45.
58. State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (1970). In Anderson, the
court said: "No verbatim transcript Is required, nor would this court review
it if It had been transmitted." Id. at 1139, 229 So.2d at 340.
59. LA. Co NST. art. VII, § 10 provides in part: "In criminal matters, Its
[Louisiana supreme court] appellate jurisdiction extends to questions of
law only."
60. State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969); State v. Vines,
245 La. 977, 162 So.2d 332 (1964).
61. See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
62. 257 La. 956, 244 So.2d 846 (1971).
63. 258 La. 835, 248 So.2d 307 (1971).
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not made part of the bills reserved on the constitutional error.
While applying the federal rule, however, the court made no
mention of prior inconsistent cases 64 pertaining to the limitation
of the scope of review under the bill of exceptions procedure and
the prohibition against review of the sufficiency of evidence. Fur-
ther, the application of the federal rule in cases like these raises
heretofore dormant equal protection problems."
Finally, in State v. Hills,8 the Louisiana supreme court again
reverted to the use of the state rule in the face of constitutional
error. The court supported this by language from Chapman sup-
posedly permitting the application of the state rule 1 This con-
clusion, however, is questionable in light of pertinent language
to the contrary in the same decision. 8
Conclusion.-Possible Solutions
The Louisiana supreme court could avoid the harmless error
dilemma simply by refusing to apply either harmless error rule
64. See notes 58 and 60 supra.
65. Because of the limitations on appellate review in Louisiana criminal
cases, the equal protection-free transcript relationship was not so acute.
In Draper v. State of Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court
said that a state had a duty to provide indigents only as adequate a review
as that given appellants with funds, and that the bill of exception procedure
was not inherently inadequate. However, if the Louisiana supreme court
in the McGregor and Mixon decisions was initiating the use of the federal
rule whenever the complete transcript was in fact before the court, then
inequality would result. See State v. McGregor, 257 La. 956, 244 So.2d 846
(1971) (Barham, J., dissenting). A defendant who made the complete
transcript part of the record would be at a comparative disadvantage
(for purposes of determining harmless error) to a defendant who did not;
assuming, of course, that in the latter case the court, recognizing its
inability to apply the federal rule without the full transcript before it,
would have no choice but to reverse automatically without necessarily
finding prejudice.
66. 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 394 (1971).
67. The following language was quoted from Chapman: "We are urged
by petitioners to hold that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of
the facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful. . . . We
decline to adopt any such rule. All 50 States have harmless-error statutes
or rules . . . . None of these rules . . . distinguishes between federal con-
stitutional errors and errors of state law . . . . All of these rules, state
or federal, serve a very useful purpose . . . .We conclude that there may
be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case
are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic
reversal of the conviction." Id. at 452-53, 250 So.2d at 400. It is submitted,
however, that this language only establishes that harmless error may now
be found in some cases of federal constitutional violations; it does not
authorize the use of state rules in such a determination.
68. See note 12 supra.
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and instead reversing the conviction automatically whenever it
is determined that a violation of a federal constitutional right
has occurred.6 9 As Justice Barham pointed out,70 the United
States Supreme Court requires the federal rule to be applied
only if harmless error is to be determined. As a practical matter,
this approach seems unacceptable to the writer. The great dis-
advantage of automatic reversal lies in sacrificing judicial econ-
omy by requiring re-trial of all cases tainted by constitutional
error, regardless of how overwhelming the evidence of guilt and
how certain the reconviction. The doctrine of harmless error was
itself specifically designed to remedy these very shortcomings.
A more viable solution could be effected by legislation
amending the bill of exception procedure to allow the necessary
record to be brought up on appeal. This could be accomplished
with a procedure similar to the appendix 71 used in federal courts.
The defendant-appellant would indicate those parts of the record
supporting his claim of error, and the state would add to the
appendix whatever would be necessary, in the prosecutor's opin-
ion, to allow a finding of harmless error, including the entire
record. The defendant could then be allowed to add further testi-
mony to refute the contention of harmless error.
In the absence of legislative action, another solution might
consist of the court on its own motion ordering up complete
transcripts whenever harmless error is contended. In so doing,
the court would face a major, though not insurmountable, obsta-
cle in article VII of the Louisiana constitution, presently inter-
preted as prohibiting review of the sufficiency of evidence for
conviction. The language of article VII, however, prohibits review
of only questions of fact; the jurisprudence has included the
sufficiency of evidence in this prohibition. It is believed that such
an interpretation is not compelling, especially in light of author-
ity to the contrary.7 2
69. All that is necessary is a determination from a set of facts whether
or not the alleged violation occurred. This can be done with the bill of
exceptions procedure without looking to the rest of the evidence to deter-
mine the effect of the error or the amount of untainted evidence.
70. State ,v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 1140, 229 So.2d 329, 341 (1969)
(Barham, J., dissenting).
71. See FED. R. APP. P. 30.
72. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Coronado v. United
States, 266 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 851 (1959); Karn v.
United States, 158 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1946); Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d
570 (1st Cir. 1946). see also Note, 30 LA. L. Rev. 492 (1970).
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In conclusion, it is clear that harmless constitutional error
remains an unsolved problem in Louisiana criminal procedure.
In the opinion of this writer, the proper application of the federal
rule conflicts with present statutory provisions. Hopefully, a
solution will be found that not only resolves the dilemma but
also benefits our system of criminal justice.
E. B. Dittmer II
AGREEMENTS NOT TO COMPETE
American courts traditionally have refused to enforce agree-
ments not to compete in a business, profession or trade unless
such restrictive covenants are merely incidental to the primary
purpose of a larger lawful transaction.' Usually an ancillary
agreement between competitors which limits competition is
presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation
of the federal antitrust laws;2 frequently, however, noncompeti-
tion agreements are used in connection with interests thought
to require protection, such as the sale of a business,s a lease,4
a partnership dissolution5 or a contract of employment.6 In most
jurisdictions these noncompetition agreements will be considered
reasonable, and thus enforceable, if considering the subject
matter, the type of business and the relationship of the parties,
the restriction is intended to afford fair protection to the inter-
ests of the covenantee and not so comprehensive as to impinge
unreasonably upon the public interest or to place undue hard-
ship on the party restricted.7 This broad rule has resulted in
varying interpretations and applications throughout the Amer-
ican court system.8
1. Irving Inv. Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.J. 217, 69 A.2d 725 (1949).
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
3. Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, 164 F. Supp.
1 (S.D. Fla. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); Hirsh v. Miller, 249
La. 489, 187 So.2d 709 (1966).
4. Goldberg v. Tr-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1942); M. M.
Ullman & Co. v. Levy, 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931).
5. McCray v. Blackburn, 236 So.2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Schlag v.
Johnson, 208 S.W. 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
6. Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941);
Aetna Fin. Co. v. Adams, 170 So.2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
247 La. 489, 172 So.2d 294 (1965).
7. Ceresta v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. App. 1951).
8. The first case to reach the courts on noncompetition agreements was
the Dyer case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414), and the court
struck the covenant down as a restraint on economic freedom, regardless
of its reasonableness. The first case to uphold such an agreement was
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